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Abstract 
We investigate the spatially heterogeneous impact of the US federal mortgage interest 
deduction (MID) on the location and tenure decisions of households. We develop a general-
equilibrium model at the county level featuring an endogenous itemization of housing subsidies. 
Despite being an important tax expenditure, repealing the MID would only slightly lower 
homeownership rates while leaving welfare mostly unchanged. The policy is ineffective 
because it targets locations with congested housing markets, creating a spatial shift of the 
housing demand toward areas that capitalize the subsidy into higher prices. We provide 
evidence that a repeal of the MID is to be preferred to an increase of standard tax deductions as 
recently implemented under President Trump's administration. 
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1 Introduction
Every year, the US federal government forgoes tens of billions of tax revenue to sub-
sidize homeownership. In 2013, the Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID) represented
about 6% of the United States federal income tax revenue, that is about 98.5 bil-
lion USD. Yet this substantial tax expenditure is far from being equally distributed
across the country’s territory. In 2013, the average owner-occupier living in New
York County (NY) received 1’813 USD in housing subsidies – about 2.13 times as
much as the average owner-occupier in the US, whereas owner-occupiers of Sheridan
County (WY) received an average of 222 USD per capita – about one fourth of the
US average housing subsidy. In this paper, we investigate how this unequal geo-
graphic distribution of MID subsidies affects local labor and housing markets and,
ultimately, welfare.
To this end, we start by developing a spatial general equilibrium model featuring
the main characteristics of the US federal income tax system. In our model indi-
viduals respond endogenously to tax incentives by choosing where to live, where to
work, and tenure mode. If they become owner-occupiers, they can decide whether to
deduct from their taxable income a standard deduction, common to both renters and
owners, or the interests paid on a mortgage loan. We calibrate our model to replicate
the observed distribution of renters, owner-occupiers, commuting flows, and income
across US counties. Keeping federal public expenditure constant, we find that sud-
denly repealing the MID would lower homeownership rates by only 0.19 percentage
points, implying that the Federal Government has to forgo approximately 32′000
USD of yearly income tax revenue to create a single new owner-occupier. The re-
peal would even slightly increase welfare by 0.01%, suggesting that every year US
citizens would willingly pay about 37 million USD to abandon the MID.
The slightly positive welfare effect of the repeal is the aggregate result of hetero-
geneous responses occurring at the local level, which are mainly given by the migra-
tion response of residents from congested housing markets to more elastic ones, by
a shift of the housing demand from the owner-occupied to the rental market, and
by a decrease of costly commuting flows across counties. As a result of these re-
sponses, the spatial inequality of the income distribution across counties is lowered
by 0.05%. When using the structure of the model to quantify the importance of
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Figure 1: County-level MID descriptives in 2013
(a) Average subsidy per homeowner (b) Probability of itemization
Note: Tax and MID subsidy data stem from Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Housing values provided by the American Community
Survey (ACS) are averaged over 2009-2013. MSAs areas are defined according to Saiz (2010).
spatial spillovers for the migration response of renters and owner-occupiers to the
repeal, we find that approximately 33% of the residents’ elasticity is due to non-
local indirect effects. These non-local effects are mostly due to the spatial linkages
between locations via commuting, whereas migration and trade are less important.
In our spatial framework, we allow locations to differ in terms of productivity,
housing supply elasticity, and amenities. The spatial distribution of renters and
owner-occupiers is determined by the opposing effect of agglomeration and dispersion
forces. The accessibility via commuting to productive locations and home markets
effects lead people to concentrate in some locations, whereas housing markets and
idiosyncratic tastes for location and tenure disperse them. In this baseline setting,
MID subsidies counter the dispersion force of housing markets for homeowners,
as they are proportional to the periodic cost of ownership. Due to commuting
linkages between locations, congested housing markets of productive locations do
not necessarily prevent people from working in that location and, vice versa, low-
productivity places might still attract residents. We match our model to observed
data on the distribution of renters, owners, and commuting flows, as well as to
estimated parameters for local housing supply elasticities, trade and commuting
costs elasticities. The unique equilibrium solution of the model allows us to recover
location fundamentals – productivity and individuals’ taste for locations and tenure
– that perfectly mimic the geographic distribution of the observed data.
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Housing supply elasticities are of particular importance in our setting, as they
affect the equilibrium response of local housing markets to shifts in the housing
demand. In order to analyze demand shifts between rental and onwer-occupied
markets, we model two separate supply functions for these markets. This allows
us to track tenure-specific equilibrium changes in the periodic costs of housing.1
Following Saiz (2010) methodology, we use US Census data on housing prices and
stock changes between 1980 and 2000 to estimate housing supply elasticities at the
county level. Specifically, we use housing demand shifters exogenous to the economic
channels present in the structural framework to recover the shape of the housing
supply function. Complementing the existing literature, we find novel evidence
that county-level housing supply elasticities show important spatial variation within
urban areas and between urban areas and the countryside.
Our spatial framework entails several advantages. First, it allows us to inves-
tigate a variety of tax policies affecting the way housing subsidies are distributed
across US counties. As shown in Figure 1, a spatial approach seems pertinent, as the
distribution of per capita MID subsidies varies considerably across locations (panel
a) and itemization rates are spatially concentrated in congested housing markets
displaying high housing prices (panel b).2 Existing research has mostly focused on
aggregate (MSAs) areas comprising these congested markets and estimated the av-
erage effect of a homogeneous marginal change in MID subsidies. Second, the spatial
linkages present in the structure of the model allow us to understand and quantify
local spatial spillovers generated by the initial heterogeneous shock of the MID re-
peal. This quantification is important to determine the aggregate welfare response
of the repeal. In that regard, empirical research has to suppose that the Stable Unit
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) is fulfilled to estimate the causal impact of
MID subsidies, which precludes the possibility of spatial spillovers within treated
areas and from treated areas to non-treated ones.3 Third, our model allows us to
investigate the joint decision of where to live, where to work, and tenure mode. This
1A similar approach has been adopted by Glaeser (2008) in the case of skilled and unskilled workers
consuming heterogeneous types of housing goods that are produced by separate supply functions.
2Gyourko and Sinai (2003) point out that the distribution of income-tax subsidies benefiting to
owner-occupiers remains stable over time.
3A standard approach in the literature has been to use a high level of aggregation, such as MSAs, to
alleviate these spatial spillovers. However, as pointed out by Monte et al. (2018), spatial linkages
between locations remain important when using this level of aggregation.
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is a novel mechanism not explored in the existing structural literature. In the real
world, we do expect individuals to react to tax incentives by adapting their location
and tenure choices, thereby altering the geographic distribution of residents and
workers across space.
Simulation results suggest that an unexpected MID repeal would lead to a slight
welfare increase. However, such a repeal would likely be met with hostility by owner-
occupiers. A legitimate question is thus whether the federal government might want
to implement alternative policies to reduce the disparity in the tax treatment of
renters and owner-occupiers. Despite not being its main aim, a recent example of
such a policy is provided by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), which was promoted
by President Trump’s administration and came into force in January 2018. One of
the major elements of President Trump’s tax reform is the doubling of the standard
deduction that households (both renters and owner-occupiers) can deduct from their
taxable income.4 We use the general applicability of our structural framework to
evaluate the welfare impact of this increase of the standard deduction. Following
President Trump’s reform, we find that homeowners’ MID itemization rates drop
from 30.4% to 0.65% and homeownership rates decrease by 0.02 percentage points,
leading to a welfare decrease of 0.05% for the whole of the country. Put differently,
every year US citizens would willingly pay about 544 million USD to avoid this
specific feature of the TCJA. The welfare decrease is mainly due to the subsidization
of housing in the countryside, which diverts workers from productive areas.
The present paper contributes to three strands of the literature. The first strand
investigates the impact of the MID on ownership attainment and various economic
outcomes.5 Recent empirical research suggests that the MID is an ineffective instru-
ment to increase homeownership. Hilber and Turner (2014) empirically show that
the US federal and state MIDs capitalize into higher prices in major urban areas
characterized by tightly regulated housing market, thus achieving little to improve
homeownership rates. By endogenizing tenure choices and calibrating a two-region
framework for Boston (MA), Binner and Day (2015) argue that it might be possible
to reform the MID while leaving homeownership rates unchanged. Gruber et al.
4Some features of the reform, such as the doubling of the standard deduction, are expected to
come to an end in 2025.
5See Hilber and Turner (2014) for a comprehensive review of the literature.
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(2017) empirically analyse a major policy reform in Denmark, which led to a sub-
stantial reduction of the MID for top-rate taxpayers. Their findings provide strong
evidence that removing the subsidy mainly lowered housing prices and had no ef-
fects on homeownership attainment. Sommer and Sullivan (2018) use a dynamic
macroeconomic model to show that abolishing the MID in the US would lead to a
higher welfare. The equilibrium channels driving this welfare gain are lower house
prices, higher homeownership rates, and lower mortgage debt.
Another strand of the literature investigates the spatial (mis)allocation of work-
ers and the role of housing supply. Calibrating a model for US metropolitan areas,
Albouy (2009) analyses the impact of the US federal income taxation on the allo-
cation of workers across space. He persuasively shows that for a given real income,
workers in high-density areas end up paying more taxes than those in more remote
areas. Adopting a structural approach, Diamond (2016, 2017) investigates the link
between housing supply and labor markets. In particular, these studies show that,
because affecting the migration response of workers, housing supply elasticities can
be exploited to identify the slope of the labor demand curve. Fajgelbaum et al.
(2019) investigate how the dispersion of US state income tax rates affects the loca-
tion choices of households across states. The authors show that the more pronounced
the differences in income tax rates between US states are, the higher the welfare loss
for the society, as workers spatially misallocate across space due to tax differentials.
Hsieh and Moretti (2019) find that housing supply constraints misallocate workers
by preventing them from working in productive areas, thereby hindering economic
growth.
Finally, we contribute to the structural literature that investigates quantita-
tive economic geography models by introducing several model extensions, such as
households’ joint decision of residential location, working place, and housing tenure.
Monte et al. (2018) integrate the spatial interdependence of trade, commuting, and
migration in a tractable model. Similarly, Favilukis and Van Nieuwerburgh (2018)
assess the effect of out-of-town home buyers on major cities like New York in a model
where heterogeneous households choose tenure and an optimal portfolio. Employ-
ing a structural framework, Blouri and Ehrlich (2019) characterize optimal regional
policies that a central government can implement under budgetary constraints to
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improve welfare and reduce income inequality across locations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
spatial equilibrium model. Section 3 describes the data, illustrates the estimation
of county-level housing supply elasticities, and explains the counterfactual analysis.
Section 4 investigates the impact of repealing the MID and analyzes the role played
by spatial spillovers to determine the migration response of local residents to the
repeal. Section 5 investigates the welfare implications of making MID itemization
less attractive via a doubling of the standard deduction. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Quantitative Spatial Model featuring Hous-
ing Subsidies
We consider an economy populated by a continuous measure L¯ of workers that are
distributed across N locations (US counties). Extending the theoretical framework
by Monte et al. (2018), each worker decides in which location i to live, in which loca-
tion j to supply one unit of labor inelastically, and its tenure model ω ∈ {O,R}. The
federal government levies income taxes at an average rate τ and uses the collected
tax revenue to provide public goods G.6 Workers earn a tenure-specific after-tax in-
come yωni which is affected by the tax subsidies provided by the federal government.
2.1 Households’ heterogeneous preferences
The indirect utility V ωni(h) of a household h living in location n, working in location
i, and having a tenure mode ω is given by the following Cobb-Douglas form
V ωni(h) =
bωni(h)
κni
Gβ
(
yωni
Pαn r
ω1−α
n
)1−β
, (1)
where bωni(h) is an idiosyncratic taste component for a specific combination of place
of residence, place of work, and tenure. We assume that the scalar utility shifter
bωni(h) is the i.i.d. realization of a random variable b
ω
ni having a Fre´chet distribution
6In Section D of the Appendix we extend our framework to include a progressive tax schedule and
show that our main results are left unchanged.
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with a cumulative density function Ωωni(b) = e
−Bωnib− . The scale parameter Bωni >
0 determines the average idiosyncratic value workers attach to a specific n/i/ω
combination, whereas the shape parameter  > 1 characterizes the taste dispersion
for such a combination. The higher the value of , the less dispersed the distribution
of tastes.
The remaining components of the indirect utility are deterministic factors com-
mon to all workers having chosen a specific combination. The variable κni denotes
exogenous commuting costs in terms of utility beared by workers living in location
n and working in i. Public good consumption is denoted by G and real after-tax
income is given by yωni/Pαn rω1−αn , where y
ω
ni denotes after-tax labor income, Pn is the
price index of a basket of tradable goods, and rωn is the tenure-specific cost of housing
per unit of surface. The share of income spent for the composite consumption good
is given by the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1] governs the workers’ fondness for
public good provision with respect to real after-tax income.
Each location specializes in the production of a single tradable consumption
good. Workers consume a composite basket of goods Cn according to the following
CES function
Cn =
(∑
i∈N
c
σ−1
σ
ni
) σ
σ−1
, (2)
where cni denotes the aggregate consumption in location n of the good produced in
i. The parameter σ governs the elasticity of substitution between tradable goods.
In equilibrium, we have that cni = αy¯nRnp
−σ
ni P
σ−1
n , where Rn is the number of
residents in location n and y¯n is location’s n per-capita disposable income. The
price index Pn depends on the price of individual varieties pni according to Pn =[ ∑
i∈N p
1−σ
ni
]1/(1−σ)
. In turn, prices pni equal a local price pi, determined where the
good is produced, multiplied by iceberg trade costs dni between any two locations.
2.2 Location-specific disposable income
The amount of per capita disposable income y¯n available in location n for tradable
goods and housing consumption is given by the after-tax income of households and
by the redistribution of public expenditure, mortgage interests, and rental payments
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to that location. We start by describing the per capita income yOni of owner-occupiers
living in n and working in i, which differs in three important aspects from the one
of renters having chosen the same commuting pattern. First, owner-occupiers have
to pay mortgage interests to the financial institution providing the mortgage loan.
Second, owner-occupiers receive an additional source of income in the form of an
imputed rent, which corresponds to the rent they would have to pay if they were
to rent the house in which they currently live in.7 Third, owner-occupiers choose
between itemizing the MID or claiming a standard tax deduction. The after-tax
income of an owner-occupier is thus given by
yOni =wi − τ(wi − ζni) +
HOnir
O
n
L¯λOni
−mni, (3)
where
ζni = max(s, θmni). (4)
The term wi denotes labor income, τ ∈ [0, 1] is the flat income tax rate set by
the federal government, and mni is the periodic interest paid on the mortgage loan.
The income component
HOnir
O
n
L¯λOni
is the imputed rent, which depends on the share λOni
of owner-occupiers living in n and working in i and their corresponding aggregate
housing consumption HOni.
8 The tax subsidy ζni is affected by two exogenous pa-
rameters, the standard tax deduction s and θ ∈ [0, 1], which governs the share of
MID deductible from the taxable income. We introduce this second parameter to
simulate changes in the deductibility of housing subsidies.9 Because renters can only
claim the standard tax deduction, their per capita disposable income is given by
yRni = wi − τ(wi − s). (5)
Note that in contrast to a standard user-cost approach, (3) is not necessarily equal to
(5). This because workers’ idyonsincratic preferences for location and tenure cause
7As pointed out in literature, for example by Sinai and Gyourko (2004) and Sommer et al. (2013),
the non-taxation of imputed rental income represents a fiscal disincentive for owner-occupiers to
become landlords and rent out their property.
8In our setting, owner-occupiers benefit from capital gains in the housing market via an increase
in their imputed rental income. In Section D.1 of the Appendix we extend the model to include
property taxes, which decrease imputed rental income.
9A repeal of MID subsidies, as implemented in our counterfactual simulations, corresponds to the
case θ = 0 such that ζni=s.
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frictions between the rental and owner-occupied market, thereby leading to income
differentials.
We now discuss the redistributive component of location’s n income. We assume
that public good expenditure, mortgage interests, and rental payments do not leave
the economy. Rather, they accrue to a global portfolio held by a mix of federal
contractors, financial institutions, and landlords. We follow Monte et al. (2018) and
assume that in each location the holders of the portfolio consume tradable goods and
housing proportionally to the number of residents in that location. The portfolio
income Π that a location receives for each one of its residents is given by
Π = G+
∑
n,i∈N(L¯λ
O
nimni +H
R
nir
R
n )
L¯
, (6)
where HRkf is the total housing consumption of renters living in n and working
in i, such that the term
∑
n,i∈N(L¯λ
O
nimni + H
R
nir
R
n ) represents the total amount of
mortgage interest and rental payments in the economy.
Total disposable income of region n is
y¯nRn = y¯
O
n R
O
n + y¯
R
n R
R
n , (7)
where Rωn is the tenure-specific number of residents. Expected disposable income y¯
ω
n
is given by tenure-specific income and per capita income from the global portfolio
y¯ωn =
∑
k∈N
λωnk|ny
ω
nk + Π, (8)
where λωni|n is the tenure-specific share of workers residing in n and working in i,
conditional on living in n, i.e. λωni|n =
λωni∑
k λ
ω
nk
.10
10There are two reasons for not adding portfolio income Π to the income yωnk of renters and owner-
occupiers. First, we don’t want the real portfolio income to modify location and tenure choices of
workers. If this were not the case, a household could decide to move to a given location to earn a
higher portfolio income, which seems unrealistic. Second, according to the American Community
Survey, over 2009-2013 about 81% of owner-occupiers in the US did not get any income from
interests, dividends, or rental income.
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2.3 Federal public good provision
Federal tax revenue is levied on the taxable labor income of renters and owner-
occupiers. Provision of the federal public good G entering the utility of workers
equals the per-capita tax revenue, such that
G =
1
L¯
∑
n∈N
(
τL¯
∑
k∈N
λRnk(wk − s) + τL¯
∑
k∈N
λOnk(wk − ζnk)
)
. (9)
The provision of G varies according to tax subsidies s and ζnk that renters and owner-
occupiers deduct from their wages. Higher subsidies imply a lower tax revenue
and thus lower public good provision. Counterfactual simulations based on the
parameters s and θ are thus unable to isolate the direct income effect of housing
subsidies on workers’ decisions. To solve this problem, we follow Fajgelbaum et al.
(2019) and allow the federal government to adjust the average income tax rate to
keep the provision of the public good unaffected by changes in the subsidies.11
2.4 Housing Markets
Households’ housing expenditure in our baseline model is tenure specific due to
their idiosyncratic tastes for a given tenure mode in a specific location, and the
fiscal incentive provided by housing subsidies. Given Cobb-Douglas preferences, the
tenure-specific expenditure for housing of workers living in location n and working
in i is
rωnH
ω
ni = (1− α)yωniL¯λωni, (10)
where Hωni is the aggregate tenure-specific housing demand of workers living in n
and working in i and rωn is the periodic housing cost. The tenure-specific total
housing expenditure Hωn in location n is obtained by adding the expenditure of
renters/owner-occupiers over all workplaces i and by including housing consumption
from the holders of the portfolio. This leads to
rωnH
ω
n = (1− α)y¯ωnRωn , (11)
11In Section C.3 of the Appendix we relax this assumption and carry out counterfactual simulations
where we allow public good provision to adjust in response to a change in the housing subsidies.
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where the right-hand side of (11) is equal to
∑
i(1− α)(yωni + Π)L¯λωni.
Owner-occupiers subscribe mortgages with an absent financial institution charg-
ing periodic mortgage interests at an exogenous rate χ set by international capital
markets. Aggregate mortgage interests of owner-occupiers living in location n and
working in i are a constant fraction of the total owner-occupied housing value in
that location
L¯λOnimni = H
O
niPOn · ξ · χ, (12)
where Pωn is the value of housing per unit of surface and ξ is the loan-to-value ratio.12
To convert the house value Pωn into a periodic (annual) cost rωn , we use the usual
finite horizon present value formula rωn = ιPωn , where ι = χ(1+χ)(1−(1+χ)−t) and t is the
lifespan of the residential unit.
We now turn to the supply side of the housing market. To analyze demand shifts
between rental and owner-occupied markets, we divide the two markets by modelling
two separate supply functions. This allows us to track tenure-specific equilibrium
changes in the periodic costs of housing. In line with Hsieh and Moretti (2019) and
Monte et al. (2018), we define tenure-specific housing supply in location n as
Hωn = H¯
ω
nPω, ηnn , (13)
where H¯ωn in an unobserved scale parameter and ηn ∈ [0,∞] is the local housing
supply elasticity. Note that we make the simplifying assumption that the elasticity
of the two markets is the same. Put differently, we allow for unobserved supply
shifters contained in H¯ωn , such as housing characteristics, to affect the supply of
rental and owner-occupied properties, but we restrict the relative supply respon-
siveness to a price shock to be the same across the two markets. The hypothesis of
same responsiveness seems reasonable if we assume that factors such as regulatory
and geographic constraints do not impact the supply elasticity of the two markets
differently. In equilibrium, housing demand equals housing supply, leading to the
12Note that the global portfolio affects mortgage payments only via the periodic cost of owner-
occupation. If this were not the case, a higher portfolio income would increase mortgage pay-
ments, which seems unrealistic.
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following expression
rωn =
(
(1− α)y¯ωnRωn
H¯ωn ι
ηn
) 1
1+ηn
. (14)
2.5 Production
Under perfect local competition and constant returns to scale as in Armington
(1969), each location specializes in the production of one type of tradable con-
sumption good. Production amenities of region n are
an = a¯nL
ν
n, (15)
where a¯n is a local exogenous productivity fundamental and Ln is the amount of
workers. External agglomeration economies are captured by the parameter ν ≥ 1,
which increases the productivity of workers. Due to this agglomeration parameter,
workers supplying labor in larger labor markets are more productive, earning, ceteris
paribus, higher nominal wages.
Because of the constant elasticity of substitution in (2) the aggregate value of
bilateral trade flows Xni is
Xni = pnicni = αy¯nRn
p1−σni
P 1−σn
, (16)
where profit maximizing firms cause prices to equal marginal production costs: pni =
dniwi
ai
. Using these profit-maximizing prices, we can compute location’s n expenditure
share for goods produced in location i
pini =
(
dniwi
ai
)1−σ
∑
k∈N
(
dnkwk
ak
)1−σ , (17)
and the corresponding price index of the composite consumption good is given by
Pn =
(
1
pinn
)1/(1−σ)
dnnwn
an
. (18)
To clear traded goods markets, location’s n workplace income must equal its expen-
12
diture on the goods produced in that location
wnLn = α
∑
k∈N
pikny¯kRk. (19)
2.6 Labor mobility and tenure choice
Workers are mobile and jointly choose the location n where to live, the location i
where to work, and tenure mode ω to maximize their indirect utility V ωni across all
possible choices. Let V¯ (h) denote this maximum utility level:
V¯ (h) = max
n,i,ω
V ωni(h). (20)
As explained in Section 2.1, the stochastic nature of the indirect utility V ωni(h) comes
from an idiosyncratic preference term bωni that is Fre´chet distributed. Because b
ω
ni
shifts multiplicatively the deterministic component of V ωni, the indirect utility is also
Fre´chet distributed. We can thus write its cumulative distribution Ψ as
Ψωni(v) = e
−B
ω
ni
κ
ni
(
Gβ
(
yωni
Pαn r
ω1−α
n
)1−β)
v−
. (21)
The share of workers λωni living in n, working in i, and having tenure ω is given by the
probability that the utility provided by this specific combination exceeds the maxi-
mal attainable utility across all other choices, i.e. λωni = Pr(V
ω
ni ≥ maxr,k,l V lrk, ∀r, k, l).
Using the fact that the variable maxr,k,l V
l
rk is also Fre´chet distributed and that
λωni = E[P (maxr,k,l V
l
rk ≤ v|V ωni = v)], we have that
λωni =
Bωni
κni
(
Gβ
(
yωni
Pαn r
ω1−α
n
)1−β)
∑
k∈N
∑
f∈N
∑
l∈ω
Blkf
κkf
(
Gβ
(
ylkf
Pαk r
l1−α
k
)1−β) . (22)
The parameter , which governs the dispersion of idiosyncratic tastes, affects the
mobility degree of workers. In the case of no taste heterogeneity across locations and
tenure (→∞), local labor supply is perfectly elastic, implying perfect population
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mobility. The expected utility for residence n and workplace i is
E[V¯ (h)] = V¯ = δ
∑
k∈N
∑
f∈N
∑
l∈ω
Blkf
κkf
(G)β ( ylkf
Pαk r
l1−α
k
)1−β
1

, (23)
where the expectation is computed according to the distribution of idiosyncratic
preferences and δ = Γ( −1

) is a Gamma function which depends on . Inserting
commuting shares (22) into expected utility for the residence and workplace combi-
nation (23) yields
E[V ωni] = δ
(
1
λωni
Bωni
κni
) 1

(
G
)β (
yωni
Pαn r
ω1−α
n
)1−β
. (24)
In equilibrium, we assume that workers do not want to change their place of resi-
dence, place of work, and tenure. This implies that the observed number of workers
having chosen a specific combination must be equal to the corresponding number
resulting from the distribution of idiosyncratic tastes. More precisely, summing over
the probabilities across workplaces k, yields the number of tenure-specific residents
in location n
Rwn = L¯
∑
k∈N
λwnk. (25)
Similarly, summing over the probabilities across place of residence k, yields the
numbers of tenure-specific workers in location n
Lwn = L¯
∑
k∈N
λwkn. (26)
Finally, we ease notation and define the share of workers commuting from n to
i as λni = λ
R
ni + λ
O
ni, the total number of workers as Ln = L
R
n + L
O
n and the total
numbers of residents as Rn = R
R
n +R
O
n .
2.7 Equilibrium characterization
Given the set of parameters {α, β, ν, σ, , ξ, χ, s, τ, L¯} and observed or estimated val-
ues for {λωni, wn, rωn , y¯ωn , yωni, Rωn , Lωn, ηn, dni}, we characterize the equilibrium of the
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baseline model with the following set of conditions. The budget of the federal gov-
ernment is balanced according to (9), local housing markets clear according to (14),
local labor markets clear according to (17), tradable goods market clears according
to (19), the price index formula is given by (18), and the spatial distribution of
workers/ residents satisfies (22).
These conditions represent a system of 3N + 3N2 + 1 equations, where N is the
number of locations (US counties), allowing us to recover the location fundamentals
{an, Bωni, pini, G, H¯ωn }. All endogenous variables can be expressed in terms of these
location fundamentals, exogenous variables, and parameters.13
As shown by Monte et al. (2018), this theoretical framework can be reformulated
such that Allen et al. (2016) theorem can be applied to ensure the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
3 Data and estimation
In this section, we describe the data sources available at the US county level.14
Additionally, we discuss the calibration and estimation of the exogenous parameters
required to conduct counterfactual simulations.15
3.1 Data
Parameters provided by the literature: We set the elasticity of substitution
between different varieties of tradable goods equal to σ = 5, as suggested by Si-
monovska and Waugh (2014). Following Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011) and Red-
ding (2016), we set the share of income spent by households for consumption goods
equal to α = 0.7. We set the taste dispersion parameter equal to  = 3.3, as in Monte
et al. (2018) and Bryan and Morten (2018). Following Fajgelbaum et al. (2019), the
propensity to public goods consumption is given by β = 0.22. The strength of the
13Section C of the Appendix provides further details on how to use the structure of the baseline
model to perform counterfactual simulations.
14Due to data unavailability, we exclude 87 (2.8%) out of 3143 US counties from our analysis.
15A summary of the calibrated parameters is provided in Appendix A.1. Additionally, in Appendix
A.2 we present descriptive statistics and maps of exogenous and recovered variables.
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agglomeration force is ν = 0.1, as in Allen and Arkolakis (2014). Trade costs depend
on the geographic distance between counties and on an average trade cost elasticity
ψ, such that d1−σni = dist
ψ
ni. The former is computed using GIS data, whereas the
latter is calibrated according to Monte et al. (2018), who estimate ψ = −1.29. We
conservatively set the lifespan of a house equal to t = 40, which corresponds to the
median age of buildings according to the American Community Survey (ACS) over
2009-2013.
Housing data: Based on data published by Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED), we set the country mortgage interest rate equal to χ = 0.04. This rate
corresponds to the mean mortgage interest rate offered by financial institutions in
2013 for a 30-year fixed mortgage. Using the American Community Survey (ACS),
we collect the share of owner-occupiers at the county level. We calibrate the loan
to value ratio to ξ = 0.51 using the balance sheet of households and nonprofit orga-
nizations provided the Financial Accounts of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (BGFRS). Specifically, we compute the LTV as the ratio of out-
standing home mortgages to the value of real estate assets. Monthly rents and the
value of owner-occupied houses are provided by the ACS.
Labor and income tax rates: From the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
we collect data on wages by place of work and the number of employees in 2013. By
dividing total wages by employment, we obtain per capita wages by workplace wi.
We use information on average federal income tax rates τ provided by the TaxSim
database of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in 2013.
Commuting flows: Data on bilateral commuting flows λni at the county level
stems from ACS for the years 2009-2013. Because the ACS does not report bilat-
eral commutes by housing tenure, we assume identical commuting flows for owner-
occupiers and renters in each county.16 We calculate tenure-choice specific commut-
ing shares λωni by multiplying the share of owner-occupiers and renters per county
with the commuting flow matrix λni.
16This hypothesis is supported by descriptive evidence provided by the ACS Micro-data on travel
time by housing tenure, which suggests that, on average, renters commute daily only 1.2 minutes
more than owner-occupiers, making it unlikely that their commuting flows significantly differ at
the county level.
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Income and subsidy data: To obtain disposable income of renters yRni, we use
(5) together with data on renters per capita wages wi and tax rates τ . Owner-
occupiers disposable income yOni follows from (3) together with data on per-capita
wages wi, where we set θ = 1 in the baseline case. Next, we derive the mortgage
interest rate mni to finance owning properties, which follows from substituting (10)
and (2.4) into (12) and data on income yOni . We substitute bilateral income y
ω
ni,
conditional commuting shares λni|n, and the total number of workers L¯, into (8) to
recover y¯ωn . We solve for per capita expected disposable income y¯n using (7) and the
bilateral income of owner-occupiers yOni and renters y
R
ni. Finally, using the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) data we calibrate s = 6′358 USD to ensure that the share of
households that itemize in the model matches the one observed in 2013.
Recovering location fundamentals: We recover regional productivity by sub-
stituting trade shares (17) in the market clearing condition (19). Given values for
{Ln, Rn, dni, wn, y¯n}, parameter values for {σ, α}, and estimates of dni, we recover
productivity an, production amenities a¯n and equilibrium values for bilateral trade
shares. To solve for net regional consumption amenities Bωni/κni, we substitute prices
from (18) and rents (14) in commuting shares (22).
3.2 Estimation of county-level housing supply elasticities
Following Saiz (2010), we parsimoniously parameterize the inverse local housing
supply elasticity as 1
ηn
= η + ηbuiltSbuiltn , where S
built
n is the predetermined share
of developed land in a given county. The parameters η and ηbuilt represent the
common and local components of the (inverse) supply responsiveness at the county
level, respectively, which have to be estimated. Specifically, the interaction with the
share of developed land proxies the combined effect of geographic and regulatory
constraints on local supply elasticities.17
In the appendix Section B.1, we show that the inverse housing supply elasticity
17According to Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013), more attractive places are developed first and, as
a consequence, are more tightly regulated. On the other hand, Saiz (2010) argues that geographic
constraints become binding only in developed places.
17
1
ηn
can be estimated using the following regression equation
∆ logPn = α + η∆ logQn + ηbuiltSbuiltn ∆ logQn + h¯∗n, (27)
where ∆ logPn and ∆ logQn represent price per square meter and stock growth
from 1980 to 2000, respectively.18 The error term h¯∗n represents unobserved price
dynamics. Note that (27) exclusively exploits spatial (cross-sectional) variation to
identify supply elasticity parameters, such that time dynamics are exclusively used
to partial out time-invariant unobservables at the county level.
Estimating (27) by OLS likely leads to biased estimates due to the simultaneous
effect of housing demand and supply in determining equilibrium prices and stock
quantities. To solve this issue, we instrument changes in the housing stock ∆ logQn
using exogenous demand shocks that are not modeled in our structural framework.
Specifically, we predict shifts in housing demand at the county level using i) mean
temperature levels in January, ii) fertility rates, and iii) a shift-share instrument for
changes in the ethnic composition of residents.
We motivate the choice of instruments as follows. Counties having attractive
amenities have progressively become more desirable over time, as pointed out by
Glaeser et al. (2001) and Rappaport (2007). We thus expect temperature to posi-
tively correlate with an increase in demand over time. To the extent that individuals
decide to live in the same county in which they are born – due for example to high
idiosyncratic migration costs – predetermined fertility rates are also expected to
shift housing demand upward as young adults start to bid on local housing markets,
as argued by Chapelle and Eyme´oud (2018). Finally, as argued by Altonji and Card
(1991) and Saiz (2007), housing demand is also expected to evolve according to the
(predetermined) ethnic composition of local residents. We follow and build on this
proposition, and assume that the growth in local residents can be predicted by a
weighted average of the growth (at the state level) of individuals belonging to a
specific ethnicity, where the weights are given by the initial distribution of ethnic
18Due to limited data availability, we use the average surface of consumed housing at the region
level provided by the US census to compute prices per square meter. In the appendix Section
B.3, we conduct a robustness check by including additional housing characteristics measured at
the county level.
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Table 1: County-level housing supply elasticity estimates
Dependent variable: Growth of housing prices per m2 between 1980 and 2000 (∆ logP)
Instruments: Log-temperature Fertility rate Shift-share All three
ethnicity instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ logQ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.144) (0.151) (0.147)
Sbuiltn ∆ logQ 1.908
∗∗ 2.026∗∗∗ 1.909∗∗ 2.088∗∗
(0.788) (0.715) (0.845) (0.815)
Observations 3.098 3.098 3.098 3.098
Underidentificationa 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004
Weak identificationb 8.963 13.890 10.252 15.697
Overidentificationc . . . 0.514
Note: Clustered standard errors at the state level in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. a) P-value of the Kleibergen-
Paap LM statistic. b) Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. The critical values for 10/15/20% maximal IV size are 7.03/4.58/3.95 in columns
1 to 3 and 26.68/12.33/9.10 in column 4, respectively. c) P-value of Hansen J statistic.
groups.19
Median housing prices of owner-occupied housing units and total housing stock
at the county level are provided by decennial US censuses and available on IPUMS
(Manson et al. 2017). GIS raster data on the share of developed land comes from
the ”Enhanced Historical Land-Use and Land-Cover Data Sets” provided by the US
Geological Survey. This data set exploits high-altitude aerial photographs collected
from 1971 to 1982.20 Mean January temperature comes from the Natural Amenities
Scale data published by the Department of Agriculture. County-level fertility rates,
measured as live births by place of residence divided by the total population, are
downloaded from IPUMS, which contains the Vital Statistics: Natality & Mortal-
ity Data and the population decennial census data. To calculate the shift-share
instrument, we use ethnicity information using census data from IPUMS.
Table 1 shows estimated values of the parameters η and ηbuilt in (27). In columns
1 to 3 we report estimation results when using each instrument separately. Column
4 show estimation results when all three instruments are used simultaneously. As
19We use the following main ethnic groups: White, Black or African American, American Indian
and Alaska Native, and Asian and Pacific Islander, and a category encompassing remaining
ethnic groups. See Appendix B.2 for further computational details.
20Because the large majority of the data is collected before 1980, we consider it predetermined
with respect to our period of analysis.
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required by the theory, the sign of estimated parameters is positive. In particular, the
higher the share of developed land in a given county, the higher ηn, thus resulting into
a lower local housing supply elasticity. Additionally, the magnitude of the estimated
coefficients is relatively stable across the instruments used to predict housing demand
growth.
Using the estimates of our preferred specification (column 4 of Table 1), we
compute county-level supply elasticities as ηn = 1/(η + η
builtSbuiltn ). We obtain
supply elasticity values ranging from 0.39 (Queens county, NY) to 2.25 (Banner
county, NB). In Sections B.3 and B.4 of the Appendix, we provide further evidence
about the reliability of our estimates by controlling for potential supply shifters and
comparing our estimates with those of Saiz (2010).
3.3 Counterfactual analysis
We use the theoretical framework presented in Section 2 to undertake model-based
counterfactual simulations about the spatial implications of the MID. Specifically,
we evaluate two alternative policies that modify how housing subsidies are allocated
to individuals. With the first policy we analyze the economic impacts of suddenly re-
pealing the MID. In the second counterfactual simulation, we investigate the general
equilibrium effects of a doubling of the standard deduction, as recently implemented
in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) under President Trump’s administration.
To quantify the welfare impact of modifying existing housing subsidies, we intro-
duce the counterfactual ‘hat’ notation developed by Dekle et al. (2007) and denote
a counterfactual change as xˆ = x
′
x
, where x is the observed variable and x′ its coun-
terfactual value. To avoid modeling potentially complex changes in the allocation of
public good provision by the federal government, we follow Fajgelbaum et al. (2019)
and keep public good provision constant in all our counterfactual simulations. Using
(24), we can then write spending-constant (Gˆ = 1) counterfactual changes in US
welfare as ̂¯V = ( 1
λ̂ωni
) 1

(
ŷωni
Pˆαn r̂
ω1−α
n
)1−β
. (28)
Equation (28) makes apparent that a cost-benefit analysis of modifying existing
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housing subsidies should take into account not only real income changes, but also
changes in the commuting flows between local areas. A complete description of the
system of equations characterizing counterfactual simulations is presented in Section
C.1 of the Appendix. To provide a better intuition of our results, in what follows we
separately report counterfactual changes for each one of the endogenous variables
entering (28).
4 Repealing the Mortgage Interest Deduction
We start our analysis by investigating the welfare impacts of repealing the MID for
owner-occupiers. To this end, we shock the economic system by setting θ = 0 in
(4).21
4.1 Overall impact
Table 2 shows aggregate results for the whole of the country. We compute aggre-
gate counterfactual changes of a given welfare component by computing a weighted
average of changes at the county level. The weighting scheme is adapted depending
on the considered welfare component.22 Columns 1 to 3 show counterfactual results
when location (place of residence and place of work) and tenure choices are kept
fixed as in the baseline scenario. Keeping location and tenure choices fixed, allows
us to investigate the initial income impact of repealing the MID without diving
into the sorting and tenure response of individuals. In columns 4 to 6 we do allow
individuals to adapt their location and tenure choices to the repeal of the subsidy.23
21In Section C of the Appendix we provide further details on our counterfactual simulations. In
the Appendix D, we show the results of a repeal of the MID in presence of property taxes and a
progressive tax schedule.
22We weight using the level of the relevant outcome variable observed in the baseline scenario.
Changes in commuting are weighted using baseline commuting flows, changes in residents, in-
come, price indices, housing costs are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages
are weighted by the number of workers.
23The baseline outcomes for the two groups of columns (1 to 3 and 4 to 6) are the same, which
allows us to compare their changes when pertinent. Because location and tenure choices are fixed
in columns 1 to 3, thus leading to a welfare disequilibrium between renters and owner-occupiers,
we do not report counterfactual changes in welfare, commuting flows, and residents for these
columns.
21
Table 2: Repealing the Mortgage Interest Deduction
Keeping location and Varying location and
tenure choices fixed tenure choices
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)
Welfare (Vˆn) - - - 0.01 0.01 0.01
Commuting (
∑
n6=i λ
′
ni/
∑
n 6=i λni) - - - 0.54 −0.41 −0.10
Residents (Rˆn) - - - 0.54 −0.29 -
Regional income (yˆni) 0.10 −0.07 −0.02 0.09 −0.11 −0.09
Wages (wˆi) −0.03 −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.03
Housing costs (rˆn) 0.03 −0.04 −0.01 0.30 −0.20 −0.02
Price index (Pˆn) −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02
Real income (yˆni/Pˆαn rˆ
1−α
n ) 0.11 −0.03 0.01 0.02 −0.04 −0.06
Note: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to keep federal public expenditure fixed.
The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. In columns 1 to 3 workers do not adjust place of residence, place of work and tenure
mode. We allow for these responses in columns 4 to 6. County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages
based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the number of commuters.
Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by
the number of workers.
In columns 1 to 3, owner-occupiers experience a negative income shock, while
renters a positive one. This because owner-occupiers that were itemizing the MID
cannot do so anymore and renters are those that mostly benefit from a tax rate re-
duction of 1.00% following the increase in the tax revenue of the federal government.
Because owner-occupiers are more numerous than renters, the overall income effect
is negative. This, in turn, leads to a decrease in the consumption of tradable goods
and to a corresponding decrease in wages. Housing costs also decrease (increase)
for owner-occupiers (renters) following the initial income shock. The increase in
housing costs for renters does not compensate the decrease in the price of tradable
goods and the income increase, resulting in a real income increase.
When individuals are allowed to relocate and choose their tenure mode, repeal-
ing the MID leads to a welfare increase of 0.01%. We observe a shift of the housing
demand from the owner-occupied towards the rental market, as shown by the change
in the number of residents reported in columns 4 and 5. In total, homeownership
rate decreases by 0.19 percentage points due to the repeal. This shift of the hous-
ing demand amplifies the response of housing cost changes, leading to even higher
(lower) periodic costs of renting (owning) a property. For renters, the increase in
22
housing costs considerably dampens the positive real income increase, which only
amounts to 0.02%. The decrease in regional income of owner-occupiers outweighs
the decrease in housing cost and price index, leading their real income to decrease
by 0.04%. Population mobility thus dilutes the real income gain experienced by
renters, allowing owner-occupiers to also benefit – or limit their losses – following
the repeal.24
Albeit the considerable size of the MID policy, we attribute the relatively small
decline in homeownership rates to three main factors. First, in contrast to other
studies, in our model workers have idiosyncratic preferences for tenure and loca-
tions, implying that they are imperfectly mobile and do not fully react to real
income changes. Second, those areas in which owner-occupiers do not itemize the
MID because housing values are not high enough are not affected by the repeal.
Additionally, even in extremely expensive locations owner-occupiers can still claim
the standard deduction. Third, in line with the reasoning of Hilber and Turner
(2014), our estimated housing supply elasticities suggest that counties belonging to
MSAs are fairly inelastic, thus leading to a capitalization on the subsidy in to higher
housing prices.
Welfare changes presented in Table 2 draw a global portrait of the welfare con-
sequences of repealing the MID. However, as noted before, housing subsidies are un-
evenly distributed across space, with high productive areas receiving most of them.
This uneven distribution implies that the repeal affects some areas more than others.
In that regard, it is difficult to explain changes in incoming commuting flows in Ta-
ble 2 without considering the geography of the repeal. In the next section, we thus
analyze how the impact of the repeal changes across space and, in particular, how
it affects the location and tenure decision across MSA and countryside counties. To
this end, we exclusively focus on the case with varying location and tenure choices.
24Note that because they face a unique local market price, differences in counterfactual price index
changes between renters and owner-occupiers are exclusively due to differences in the weighting
scheme.
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Figure 2: Repealing the Mortgage Interest Deduction: County-level counterfactual
changes
(a) After-tax income of owner-occupiers (ˆ¯yOn )
(b) Homeownership rate (Rˆ
O
n/Rˆn) (c) Periodic cost of ownership (rˆOn )
Note: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Workers can change place of residence, place of
work, and tenure mode. We depict positive (negative) growth in green (red). A darker shading represents
a stronger effect.
4.2 Changes in the spatial distribution
Figure 2 shows selected counterfactual changes that are particularly relevant for our
analysis.25 As it can be seen, the negative impact of the MID repeal on the after-tax
income of owner-occupiers (panel a) is mostly concentrated in MSAs such as New
25The interested reader might refer to Appendix C.2 for the full set of maps representing counter-
factual changes.
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Figure 3: Repealing the MID: MSAs vs. countryside
(a) Renters (b) Owners
Note: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to keep federal public expenditure
fixed. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. Workers can change place of residence, place of work, and tenure mode. MSAs
are defined according to Saiz (2010). County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages based on the
distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in
residents, (real) income, rents, and prices are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of
workers.
York, San Francisco, and Chicago. Unsurprisingly, these are the places where home-
ownership rates and housing prices decrease the most (panels b and c). In fact, these
areas feature high MID itemization rates and low housing supply elasticities. On the
contrary, as shown in panel a, onwer-occupiers in the countryside experience even
a positive income shock, an effect which was masked by the aggregation scheme in
Table 2. In countryside areas the decrease in homeownership rates is more contained
(panel b) and is mostly due to an increase in the periodic cost of ownership (panel
c) caused by a shift of the housing demand. As evident from Figure 2, the impact of
the repeal strongly varies between metropolitan areas and the countryside. In what
follows we thus investigate counterfactual changes across these two areas.
Figure 3 shows a stacked barplot of the impact of repealing the MID for renters
(panel a) and owner-occupiers (panel b) living in counties located within and outside
major urban areas. Specifically, panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3 correspond to columns
4 and 5 of Table 2, respectively. Panels (a) and (b) show that the largest part of
the impacts documented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 are driven by MSA regions.
Non-MSA areas experience, in general, the same type of welfare impact (same sign)
but of lower magnitude. A notable exception to this rule is the real income of
owner-occupiers, which decreases in MSA areas but increases in the countryside.
We explain this opposite effect with the fact that most owner-occupiers living in
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counties located in the countryside were not itemizing the MID in the baseline
specification and thus fully benefit from the income tax rate decrease following the
MID repeal.
When computing the aggregate effect of panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3, counter-
factulal changes for the welfare components of owner-occupiers dominate those of
renters, mostly because they are more numerous. Because the MID repeal makes
MSA counties which previously claimed the MID relatively less attractive compared
to the baseline scenario, the aggregate effect also shows a clear shift of total residents
from MSA to non-MSA areas (see Figure C.1 in the appendix). A simple analysis
of concentration (Gini) indices reveals that the repeal systematically lowers spatial
inequalities of income across counties by 0.05%. We observe a similar reduction in
spatial inequality for workers, and residents (see Table C.1 in the Appendix).
Notably, because the wage response is approximately the same for columns 1 to
3 and 4 to 6, we argue that that increases in agglomeration economies occurring
in the countryside due to the relocation of workers partially counter the loss in
productivity occurring in MSAs. Indeed, renters counter the increase of rental costs
by commuting over longer distances, whereas the decrease of ownership cost allows
owner-occupiers to live closer to their place of work, resulting in a 0.41% decrease in
commuting. Overall, commuting decreases by 0.10%. Because commuting is costly
in terms of welfare, this overall commuting decrease improves welfare.
4.3 Housing subsidies and spatial spillovers
An important body of empirical work in economics aims to quantify the causal im-
pact of place-based policies on a variety of economic outcomes. Recently, researchers
have started to raise doubts about the reliability of empirical estimates describing
the (average) treatment effect of place-based policies due to a potential violation of
the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA).26 Questioning the validity
of the SUTVA seems natural when investigating policies affecting determined areas
due to the spatial linkages between regions. In fact, these linkages might create
spatial spillovers from treated to non-treated areas and from treated areas to other
26See Baum-Snow and Ferreira (2015) for a comprehensive review of the issue.
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treated areas, thus biasing treatment effect estimates.
As discussed in the previous sections, MID subsidies are itemized, on average,
only in places with congested housing markets displaying high housing costs. More-
over, housing subsidies are usually unequally distributed across itemizing areas,
creating heterogeneous treatment effects. Virtually all studies aiming to quantify
the impacts of housing subsidies across space rely on empirical analyses exploiting
this variation in the magnitude of the subsidies among recipient regions. However,
the aggregate efficiency of spatially targeted housing subsidies critically depends on
migration and commuting responses, the shift between rental and owner-occupied
demand, and local prices in general. Ignoring the spatial spillovers of the subsidies to
other regions amounts to quantifying partial equilibrium effects.27 In our structural
model, spatial spillovers take the form of complex general equilibrium responses
through labor mobility and trade linkages. Because we calibrate labor mobility
with real-world patterns, these spillovers are not necessarily limited to neighboring
regions.
In this section, we suggest a model-based strategy allowing to quantify the mag-
nitude of spatial spillovers for residential location choices and thus, indirectly, to
determine whether they represent a sizable limitation of empirical studies.28 To this
end, in a first step we formalize the general equilibrium elasticity of local residents to
housing subsidies. In a second step, we disentangle the impact of local and non-local
effects (spatial spillover) on this elasticity.
27Some empirical studies try to alleviate the issue of spatial spillovers by excluding observations in
the immediate proximity of treated regions from the control group. From a general equilibrium
perspective, this is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, spatial linkages are not necessarily
limited to neighboring areas. Second, spillovers also occur within treated areas.
28A similar analysis can be performed for the elasticity of other outcomes. We focus on the elasticity
of local residents because of its relevance for the policy we analyze.
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4.3.1 Understanding residential location choices
Let γR
ω
n , θ = dR
ω
n
dθ
θ
Rωn
denote the tenure-specific elasticity of local residents to housing
subsidies. By computing the total derivative of (25) with respect to θ, we have
γR
ω
n , θ =(1− β)
(∑
k∈N
L¯ωλωnk
Rωn
γy
ω
nk, θ −
∑
k∈N
∑
f∈N
λωkfγ
yωkf , θ
)
−(1− β)α
(
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Rωk
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Rωk
L¯ω
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ω
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)
+ γL¯
ω , θ.
(29)
where γ·, θ denotes the elasticity of a given variable with respect to housing subsidies.
Equation (29) tells us that the relative change in the spatial distribution of
residents due to a relative change in housing subsidies is determined by three main
channels. The first channel is the income response to the subsidy. The second and
third channels describe the relationship between housing subsidies and the price of
tradable goods and housing costs, respectively.29
The first term within the large parentheses always represents a change in the
local attractiveness of a location with respect to income, tradable goods prices, and
housing costs. The second term within the parentheses relates to a counterfactual
change in the attractiveness of all other locations, as their income and prices also
change. Put differently, residents in n might react to changes in housing subsidies
even if location n is not directly affected by the repeal, but its relative attractiveness
is. As such, even in counties where owners do not itemize the MID, the elasticity
of residents might be different from to zero due to spatial spillovers. A few remarks
are worth noting. First, each of the channels in (29) is tenure specific and, as such,
can have opposite sign across tenure.
Second, a crucial role in the change of residents is played by the taste dispersion
 and the share of private expenditure 1− β. Both parameters govern the degree of
mobility of people, affecting their responsiveness to housing subsidies. For example,
29As before, we assume that the federal government adjusts tax rates to keep public good provision
constant, such that the elasticity of public goods to housing subsidies is identically zero.
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when  → 1, individual taste is all that matters and residents do not respond to
housing subsidies. When  is higher, people are sensitive to a change in the subsidy.
In a similar vein, the more people care about real income over public good provision,
the stronger the incentives to relocate according to housing subsidies.
Third, the magnitude of the elasticities γ·, θ depends on exogenous location char-
acteristics. For example, the income elasticity γy
ω
nk, θ is expected to be positive and
large in magnitude in highly productive places located in MSA areas, which typically
have congested housing markets. Similarly, changes in consumption prices γPn, θ are
linked to trade costs. The housing cost response to housing subsidies γr
ω
n , θ depends
on local housing supply elasticities.
4.3.2 Quantifying the importance of spatial spillovers
As shown by (29), the elasticity of local residents in county n is composed of local
effects – originating from elasticities where k = n, i.e. γy
ω
nn, θ, γPn, θ and γr
ω
n , θ –
and non-local effects that arise from elasticities in other locations, where k 6= n,
namely γy
ω
nk, θ, γPk, θ and γr
ω
k , θ. We use this distinction to separately quantify the
role played by local and non-local income, consumption prices, and housing cost
effects in the determination of local resident elasticities with respect to housing
subsidies. Specifically, we investigate how much of the observed spatial variation of
local resident elasticities is explained by local and non-local effects.
Specifically, we quantify local resident elasticities and the corresponding local
and non-local components of (29) by simulating the MID repeal of Section 4. In
a second step, we perform a Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition by regressing local
resident elasticities on all possible combinations of the elasticity components and
computing the corresponding R2 for each combination. For each component, we
then calculate the average improvement of the R2 when adding that component as a
covariate to the regression. This average improvement is interpreted as the relative
importance of the component to explain the variation in the elasticity of residents.
Table 3 shows the results.
Panel A of Table 3 evaluates the overall importance of local and non-local chan-
nels for renters and owner-occupiers, without distinguishing which endogenous chan-
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Table 3: Importance of spatial spillovers for residents’ elasticity
Renters Owners
(1) (2)
Panel A: All channels
local 0.68 0.67
non-local 0.32 0.33
Totala 1 1
Panel B: Individual channels
Income local 0.33 0.36
Income non-local 0.21 0.18
Price index local 0.14 0.03
Price index non-local 0.03 0.03
Housing costs local 0.25 0.33
Housing costs non-local 0.05 0.07
Totala 1 1
Note: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. The reported values
correspond to the contribution of a given channel in a Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition of the residents’ elasticity. a Because (29)
is an analytical relationship, linearly regressing local resident elasticities on the full set of components leads to a perfect fit.
nel responds to the subsidies. Our results suggest that 32% and 33% of the observed
spatial variation in the elasticity of renters and owner-occupiers is due to responses
having occurred in other areas, respectively. When assessing the relative importance
of local and non-local effects for each channel entering (29), as shown in panel B, we
find that income and housing costs represent the most important channels affecting
the residential elasticities of renters and owner-occupiers, whereas the price index
of tradable goods only plays a minor role. A good part of the importance of the
income channel comes from non-local effects stemming from spatial linkages of the
labor market via commuting flows. On the contrary, non-local effects do not repre-
sent a major component of the housing costs channel, implying that the migration
response of residents is mostly affected when housing subsidies directly affect local
housing markets.
These results seem to suggest that spatial spillovers are an important component
of local elasticities of renters and owner-occupiers to housing subsidies. This impor-
tance highlights potential shortcomings of empirical analyses aiming to quantify the
causal impact of the MID on economic outcomes and welfare.
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5 Making MID itemization less attractive
Up to now we have concerned ourselves with the evaluation of the welfare impact
of repealing the MID. Despite a repeal seems to be beneficial for the country, it
would likely be met with hostility by voters and owner-occupiers in particular. A
legitimate question is thus whether a government that aims to reduce the disparity in
the tax treatment between renters and owner-occupiers can overcome this hostility
by implementing a policy that makes MID itemization less attractive.
Despite not being its main purpose, a recent example of such a policy is provided
by the TCJA, which was promoted by President Trump’s administration and came
into force in January 2018. One of the major elements of this tax reform is the
doubling of the standard deduction that households can deduct from their taxable
income.30 The areas that benefit the most from the increase in the standard de-
duction in real terms are those located in the countryside, where President Trump’s
received most votes during the 2016 US presidential election. Unsurprisingly, most
pundits expect an important drop in MID itemization rates.
In this section, we thus investigate the welfare impact of doubling the standard
deduction s.31 As in the previous section, we adjust income tax rates to keep federal
public good provision constant.
5.1 Overall impact
Table 4 shows the simulation results when doubling the calibrated value of the
standard deduction s – which increases from 6′358 USD to 12′717 USD – in (4).
Columns 1 to 3 show the impact of the tax reform when individuals cannot adapt
location and tenure choices in response to the increase of the standard deduction,
whereas in columns 4 to 6 we allow for such a response.
30Other key elements of the tax reform are reductions in tax rates for businesses and individuals,
family tax credits, limiting deductions for state and local income taxes (SALT) and property
taxes, reducing the alternative minimum tax for individuals and eliminating it for corporations,
reducing the number of estates impacted by the estate tax, and repealing the individual mandate
of the Affordable Care Act.
31Despite our model is calibrated with 2013 data, changes in the tax system between 2013 and
2017 have been minor.
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Table 4: Doubling the standard deduction
Keeping location and Varying location and
tenure choices fixed tenure choices
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)
Welfare (Vˆn) - - - −0.05 −0.05 −0.05
Commuting (
∑
n 6=i λ
′
ni/
∑
n 6=i λni) - - - −0.17 −0.38 −0.31
Residents (Rˆn) - - - 0.05 −0.03 -
Regional income (yˆni) −0.05 −0.07 −0.07 −0.28 −0.34 −0.34
Wages (wˆi) −0.20 −0.15 −0.17 −0.12 −0.09 −0.10
Housing costs (rˆn) −0.10 −0.10 −0.10 −0.18 −0.25 −0.23
Price index (Pˆn) −0.21 −0.18 −0.19 −0.09 −0.09 −0.09
Real income (yˆni/Pˆαn rˆ
1−α
n ) 0.13 0.08 0.09 −0.16 −0.20 −0.21
Note: We compute counterfactual changes by setting s = 12′717 USD. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to keep federal public
expenditure fixed. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. In columns 1 to 3 workers do not adjust place of residence, place
of work and tenure mode. We allow for these responses in columns 4 to 6. County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated
using weighted averages based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the
number of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in
wages are weighted by the number of workers.
In our simulations the share of owner-occupiers itemizing the MID drops from
30.4% to 0.65% after the tax reform comes into force, with only counties having
highly congested housing markets continuing to claim the deduction. Doubling the
standard deduction considerably decreases the tax revenue of the federal govern-
ment, which to keep public good provision constant is forced to increase income tax
rates. This increase in tax rates negatively affects the after-tax income of residents
that continue to claim the MID. Taxpayers for which the doubling of the standard
deduction is only marginally beneficial are also hurt by the increase in tax rates and
experience an income decrease. This negative income shock decreases the consump-
tion of tradable and housing goods, negatively affecting the economy of the country
and leading to a generalized wage decrease. However, because the cost of living de-
creases more than the decrease in the after tax income, renters and owner-occupiers
experience a real income increase, with renters experiencing the biggest increase.
In the case of immobile renters and owner-occupiers, our analysis seems to sug-
gest that doubling the standard deduction is beneficial, at least in terms of real
income. When people can adapt location and tenure choices with respect to the
baseline scenario, however, we find that the welfare of the country decreases by
32
Figure 4: Impact of doubling the standard deduction: MSAs vs. countryside
(a) Renters (b) Owners
Note: We compute counterfactual changes by setting s = 12′717 USD. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to keep federal public
expenditure fixed. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. Workers can change place of residence, place of work, and tenure
mode. MSAs are defined according to Saiz (2010). County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages based
on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes
in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number
of workers.
0.05%. We explain these results as follows. In the mobility scenario, because be-
ing an owner-occupier becomes relatively less attractive in most locations, many
individuals switch tenure and/or relocate to areas displaying more elastic housing
markets.32 This migration response to less productive areas further reinforces the re-
gional income decrease, which lower the demand of tradable and housing goods even
further with respect to the immobility case. The decrease in the price of tradable
and housing goods is not strong enough to compensate the income decrease, which
leads to a real income decrease, with renters experiencing a slightly less negative
decrease. In turn, because the decrease in commuting flows does not compensate
outweigh the decrease in real income, welfare decreases. Some of remaining owner-
occupiers take advantage of lower housing costs to move closer to their work place,
which results in a decrease of in-commuting.
Because, Table 4 only shows aggregate results for the whole of the country, in the
next section we provide further evidence on the spatial displacement of the housing
demand from MSAs to non-MSAs caused by the doubling of the standard deduction.
32The countrywide ownership rate is slightly reduced by 0.02 percentage points.
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5.2 Changes in the spatial distribution
Figure 4 shows the impact for renters (panel a) and owner-occupiers (panel b) liv-
ing within/outside MSAs of doubling the standard deduction . As it can be seen,
non-MSAs counties are strongly affected by the policy, with a clear shift of residents
to less productive areas. In fact, countryside counties – which usually display more
elastic housing markets – become relatively more attractive than counties located
within MSAs for two reasons. First, the real value of the standard deduction is
considerably higher in the countryside. Second, in these places the standard deduc-
tion capitalizes less into housing costs than in counties with a lower housing supply
elasticity. As is shown in Figure 4, the shift to the countryside decreases housing
costs in MSAs counties, while housing costs in the countryside increase. The shift
to places with lower agglomeration economies reinforces the decrease in regional
income of owner-occupiers and renters observed in Table 4. Because people have
to move outside MSAs to benefit from the doubling of the standard deduction, we
observe that incoming commuting flows of MSA counties strongly decrease, whereas
those of countryside counties increase.
6 Conclusions
Over the last decades, the staggering tax expenditure generated by the mortgage
interest deduction has fueled a lively debate among politicians and academicians
regarding its allocative efficiency. Evidence on the economic impacts of the unequal
geographic distribution of housing subsidies is currently missing. To analyze the
economic effects of this unequal distribution, we develop a spatial general equilibrium
model in which individuals respond endogenously to tax incentives by choosing
where to live, where to work, and tenure mode. We calibrate our model with data
for US counties, estimating, in particular, local housing supply elasticities. The
general applicability of the framework allows investigating a variety of simulations
related to income-tax subsidies.
Simulation results suggest that repealing MID subsidies while keeping public
expenditure constant leads to a moderate decrease in homeownership rates while
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slightly increasing the country welfare. The welfare gain is mostly due to a spatial
displacement of the housing demand from congested housing markets in urban areas
to more elastic housing markets in the countryside, and to a reduction in commuting
flows between these areas. In contrast to previous research, we quantify the impor-
tance of spatial spillovers for the displacement response of residents due to a change
in the subsidies, finding that they explain about one third of the response. In a
separate simulation exercise, we show that a repeal of the MID is to be preferred to
a lessening of its attractiveness via an increase of standard deductions as recently
implemented under President Trump’s administration.
Our results hold important lessons for the evaluation of housing and tax poli-
cies. Providing housing subsidies or income tax incentives significantly alters the
geographic distribution of residents and workers across space, which in turn affects
the aggregate efficiency of the policy. Non-local effects, arising via labor and goods
markets, also influence the efficiency of the policy, especially in areas having strong
spatial linkages with other ones. This prompts for a serious costs-benefits analysis
of policies that target well-connected regions, such as major urban areas.
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A Data appendix
This section contains further information about data calibration, as well as addi-
tional descriptive statistics of the outcome variables of the model.
A.1 Model calibration
Table A.1: Calibration of the parameters
Description Notation Value Reference / Source
Share of consumption expenditure α 0.7 Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011)
Share of public expenditure β 0.22 Fajgelbaum et al. (2019)
Agglomeration force ν 0.1 Allen and Arkolakis (2014)
Elasticity of substitution σ 5 Simonovska and Waugh (2014)a
Heterogeneity of preferences  3.3 Monte et al. (2018)
Loan to house value ratio ξ 0.51 BGFRS
Mortgage interest rate χ 0.04 ACS
Trade cost elasticity ψ -1.29 Monte et al. (2018)
Life span of housing structures t 40 years ACS
Standard deduction s 6358$ IRS
Housing supply elasticity ηn - Own estimation
Note: ACS: American Community Survey, BGFRS: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, IRS: Internal Revenue
Service. a) Simonovska and Waugh (2014) estimate 1− σ equal to a value of −4, which implies σ = 5.
A.2 Summary statistics
We present summary statistics of our exogenous and recovered variables in Table A.2.
Figure A.1 shows the spatial distribution of selected observed and recovered variables
of the model.
39
Table A.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Production amenities (a¯n) 1.56 0.68 0.55 10.64 3056
Commuters (L¯
∑
n6=i λni) 15.87 61.27 0.01 2143.83 3056
Renters (L¯R
∑
n6=i λ
R
ni) 5.2 26.36 0 1156.34 3056
Owners (L¯O
∑
n 6=i λ
O
ni) 10.67 36.56 0.01 987.49 3056
Own trade shares, in % (pinn) 41.91 21.99 1.58 99.57 3056
Housing supply elasticity (ηn) 1.69 0.44 0.39 2.25 3056
Wages per-capita (wn) 37.23 8.08 20.14 104.37 3056
Income per-capita (y¯n) 54.85 7.4 40.38 112.07 3056
Owners (y¯On ) 56.94 7.97 42 119.85 3056
Renters (y¯Rn ) 49.46 6.53 37.15 100.66 3056
Workers (Ln) 58.57 206.16 0.14 5939 3056
Owners (LOn ) 37.89 117.28 0.1 2876.75 3056
Renters (LRn ) 20.68 92.27 0.04 3062.25 3056
Residents (Rn) 58.57 189.32 0.08 5734.31 3056
Owners (ROn ) 37.89 106.3 0.04 2689.48 3056
Renters (RRn ) 20.68 87.21 0.04 3044.83 3056
Periodic cost of renting (rRn ) 8.1 2.16 2.95 20.8 3056
Periodic cost of ownership (rOn ) 6.26 3.66 1.7 45.17 3056
Price index (Pn) 7.5 1.15 2.19 10.31 3056
Tax rates, in % (τ) 11.36 0 11.36 11.36 3056
Owner’s tax deduction (ζn) 6.48 0.55 6.36 14.36 3056
Ownership rate (ROn/Rn) 0.72 0.08 0.19 0.94 3056
Sh. of commuters (L¯
∑
n 6=i λni/Li) 0.26 0.11 0.02 0.91 3056
Owners (L¯O
∑
n 6=i λ
O
ni/LOi ) 0.25 0.12 0.02 0.93 3056
Renters (L¯R
∑
n 6=i λ
R
ni/LRi ) 0.28 0.13 0.02 0.91 3056
Note: Commuters, residents and workers are measured in thousand inhabitants, per capita wages, per capita income and rents are
reported in thousand Dollars, Public good provision in million Dollars, and tax rates and trade shares in percent.
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Figure A.1: Overview of variables at the county level
(a) Wages (wn) (b) Residents (Rn)
(c) Productivity (an) (d) Sh. of commuters - Owners (
∑
n6=i λ
O
ni/LOi )
Note: We depict positive (negative) growth in green (red). A darker shading represents a stronger effect.
41
B Estimation of county-level housing supply elas-
ticities
In this section, we provide further information on the estimation of county-level
housing supply elasticities and on the reliability of our estimates.
B.1 From structure to empirics
We show how the supply equations (13) can be used to derive the empirical specifi-
cation (27). There are three main reasons to use (27) to estimate (inverse) housing
supply elasticities. First, it is based on directly observable variables, namely changes
in housing prices and housing stock growth. Second, it corresponds to Saiz (2010)
specification of housing suppy elasticities, which allows us to investigate the va-
lidity of our estimates at the MSA level (see Section B.4). Third, it is easier to
find instruments that capture relevant cross-sectional variation of the total housing
stock.
Log-linearizing (13), first differencing, and rearranging the terms leads to
∆ logPωn = αω +
1
ηn
∆ logHωn + h¯
ω
n, (B.1)
where the error term h¯ωn corresponds to mean-centered changes of the supply shifter
H¯ωn . According to the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the term ∆ logH
ω
n represents
tenure-specific changes of the total consumption of housing surface. We decom-
pose this total housing consumption as ∆ logHωn = ∆ log Qn + ∆ log Share of ωn +
∆ log Per capita Hωn , where Qn denotes the total housing stock in a given county.
We can thus rewrite (B.1) as
∆ logPωn = αω +
1
ηn
∆ logQn + h¯
ω,∗
n . (B.2)
The error term h¯ω,∗n now includes changes in the share of residents according to a
given tenure mode and per capita housing consumption. Parametrizing the inverse
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housing supply elasticity 1
ηn
, we obtain
∆ logPωn = αω + η∆ logQn + ηbuiltSbuiltn ∆ logQn + h¯ω,∗n (B.3)
Because we assume the same housing supply elasticity for the rental and owner-
occupied market, we drop the ω notation in the main text and use housing prices
per square meter as dependent variable.
B.2 Shift-share instrument based on ethnicity
To calculate the shift-share instrument we follow Bartik (1991) and construct an ex-
ogenous housing demand shock by interacting the predetermined local ethnic com-
position of the population with the corresponding growth rates at the state level.
The instrument should capture exogenous shifts of a given ethnicity at the county
level while avoiding endogeneity issues associated with using local growth rates.
Denoting the shift-share ethnicity instrument for changes in the housing stock
with Z∆ logHn , we use the following formula
Z∆ logHn =
∑
k
γn,kηk, (B.4)
where ηk =
Popk,−n,1990−Popk,−n,1970
Popk,−n,1970
represents the average ethnicity growth at the
state level, excluding residents of county n, and γn,k =
Popkn,1970
Popn,1970
denotes the local
residential share of ethnicity k at the beginning of the period. Ethnicity k is defined
according to the classification used in our data source assigning population to White,
Black or African American, American Indian and Alaska Native, and Asian and
Pacific Islander and other ethnicity residents.
B.3 Controlling for local supply shifters
One concern of our empirical specification is that unobserved supply dynamics con-
tained in the error term of (27) correlate with the instruments, violating the ex-
ogeneity assumption necessary for the identification of the parameters. Therefore,
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Table B.1: County-level housing supply elasticity estimates including controls
Dependent variable: Change in log housing prices (per m2) between 1980 and 2000 (∆ logP)
Instruments: Log-temperature Fertility rate Shift-share All three
ethnicity instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ logQ 0.550∗∗ 0.267 0.248∗ 0.299∗∗
(0.246) (0.187) (0.151) (0.151)
Sbuiltn ∆ logQ 2.196
∗∗∗ 2.654∗∗∗ 2.470∗∗∗ 2.629∗∗∗
(0.737) (0.666) (0.746) (0.759)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2.599 2.599 2.599 2.599
Underidentificationa 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002
Weak identificationb 7.986 12.342 7.709 21.342
Overidentificationc . . . 0.685
Note: Clustered standard errors at the state level in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. a) P-value of the Kleibergen-
Paap LM statistic. b) Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. The critical values for 10/15/20% maximal IV size are 7.03/4.58/3.95 in columns
1 to 3 and 26.68/12.33/9.10 in column 4, respectively. c) P-value of Hansen J statistic.
in this section we analyze the stability of the estimated coefficients to the inclusion
of control variables in (27) that might proxy changes in the construction cost of
housing and potentially correlate with demand changes. In particular, we control
for changes of per capita payroll in the construction sector and for changes in the
quality of the housing stock over the considered period. The housing characteristics
we investigate are the median number of rooms, median building year, and share of
detached single-family houses in the county. Data on per capita payroll from 1980
to 1997 stems from County Business Patterns (CBP), while housing characteristic
in 1980 and 2000 is published by the US census. Both data sets are provided by
IPUMS. In addition to housing characteristics, we control for relative changes in
homeownership rates that are included in the dynamics of the error term according
to Section B.1.
Table B.1 shows the results. Despite losing about 16% of the sample due to data
unavailability at the county level, controlling for supply shifters does not strongly
affect our main elasticity estimates. The coefficient of the main effect does become
less significant for the different instruments, but it remains approximately within
one and a half standard deviation of our main estimates. On the contrary, the
coefficient of the interaction effect responsible for the heterogeneity of housing supply
elasticities becomes even more significant while displaying the same magnitude. This
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seems to suggest that these observed dynamics of the construction sector do not
considerably affect the value of our housing supply elasticities estimates.
B.4 Comparison with Saiz (2010) MSAs elasticities
In this section, we compare our housing supply elasticity estimates with those com-
puted by Saiz (2010). To this end, we assign each county to a Metropolitan Statis-
tical Area (MSA) and aggregate county-level elasticity using population weighted
averages. As Figure B.1a illustrates, our estimates show a strong positive correla-
tion of about 0.6 with those of Saiz (2010). However, as evident from this figure,
we tend to recover higher housing supply elasticities as Saiz (2010). The reason for
this higher number is that Saiz (2010) potentially underestimates housing supply
elasticities, as housing transactions occurring within MSAs likely occur in dense and
more inelastic places.
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Figure B.1: Comparison of housing supply elasticity with Saiz (2010)
(a) Comparison with Saiz (2010) (b) Saiz (2010)
(c) Own-computation (ηn)
Note: In panel a) and b) we compare our housing supply elasticity with estimates described in Saiz (2010),
which are based on US metropolitan statistical areas (MSA)and in b) estimates of Saiz (2010), respectively.
A darker shading in the map indicates a higher quantile, i.e. more elastic places. In panel c) we show
recovered housing supply elasticities of our model reported by quantiles. We compute the median value for
counties belonging to the same MSA and get a correlation coefficient between Saiz (2010) and our measures
of 0.6.
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C Counterfactual analysis
This section describes the system of equations that we use to simulate counterfactual
policy experiments. Additionally, we provide complementary information on the
simulation results presented in Section 4 and 5 of the main text.
C.1 System of equations
Let xˆ = x
′
x
denote a counterfactual change, where x is an endogenous outcome
variable of the baseline model and x′ is its unobserved counterfactual value after a
shock to the tax subsidies through θ or s. We solve the following system of equations
with respect to counterfactual changes xˆ, where observed outcomes x of the baseline
specification play the role of parameters.
The counterfactual equation for wages directly follows from equilibrium wages (19):
wˆiwiLˆiLi = α
∑
n∈N
pˆinipiniRˆnRn ˆ¯yny¯n. (C.1)
Counterfactual changes in the tenure-specific number of residents and workers are
given by counterfactual changes in commuting flows, which can be derived from (25)
and (26), respectively. This leads to
RˆωnR
ω
n = L¯
∑
k∈N
λˆωnkλ
ω
nk, (C.2)
LˆωnL
ω
n = L¯
∑
k∈N
λˆωknλ
ω
kn. (C.3)
As a consequence, the total number of residents and workers is
RˆnRn = Rˆ
R
n R
R
n + Rˆ
O
nR
O
n , (C.4)
LˆnLn = Lˆ
R
n L
R
n + Lˆ
O
nL
O
n . (C.5)
We now turn to counterfactual changes to the per capita labor income of owner-
occupiers. Because they have Cobb-Douglas preferences, households spend a con-
stant fraction (1 − α) of their income for housing consumption. It follows that
47
HOnir
O
n
L¯λOni
= (1−α)yOni. Using the definition of mortgage interest in (12) and expressing
prices into a periodic cost as in (2.4), we obtain that mni = (1 − α)φyOni, where
φ = ξχ (1+χ)(1−(1+χ)
−t)
χ
defines the size of mortgage interests. Substituting these
terms into (3) and rearranging yields the following elegant expression
yOni =
wi − τ(wi − ζni)
α + φ(1− α) .
Using this equation, we can write the counterfactual equation of the per-capital
labor income of owner-occupiers as
yˆOniy
O
ni =
wˆiwi − τˆ τ(wˆiwi − ζˆniζni)
α + φ(1− α) , (C.6)
where counterfactual changes in tax subsidies are given by
ζˆniζni = max(s, θmˆnimni). (C.7)
Note that because they represent exogenous parameters, we do not employ the hat
notation for s and θ. However, depending on the simulation exercise, the reader
must interpret s or θ in (C.7) as the new value of the parameter that generates the
initial shock to the system of equations.
Renters per capita labor income directly follows from (5)
yˆRniy
R
ni = wˆiwi − τˆ τ(wˆiwi − s). (C.8)
Using (8), we can write counterfactual changes in the tenure-specific total income,
which includes both labor income and a redistributive term from the global portfolio,
as
ˆ¯yωn y¯
ω
n = L¯
∑
k∈N λ
ω
nkλˆ
ω
nk(yˆ
ω
nky
ω
nk + ΠΠˆ)
RˆωnR
ω
n
, (C.9)
where counterfactual changes in the portfolio are given by
ΠΠˆ = GˆG+
∑
k,f
(λˆOkfλ
O
kfmkfmˆkf + (1− α)yRkf yˆRkf λˆRkfλRkf ), (C.10)
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Using (7), counterfactual changes of total income must satisfy
ˆ¯yny¯n =
1
RˆnRn
(
ˆ¯yRn y¯
R
n Rˆ
R
n R
R
n + ˆ¯y
O
n y¯
O
n Rˆ
O
nR
O
n
)
. (C.11)
Using (15), we obtain a counterfactual productivity given by
aˆn = Lˆ
ν
n. (C.12)
Changes in the consumption price index are derived from (18) and must satisfy
Pˆn =
(
1
pˆinn
)1/(1−σ)
wˆn
aˆn
. (C.13)
Counterfactual changes in the tenure-specific cost of housing follow from (14) and
are equal to
rˆωn =
(
ˆ¯yωn Rˆ
ω
n
) 1
1+ηn
. (C.14)
We compute counterfactual changes in mortgage interest by substituting (10) and
(2.4) into (12), such that
mˆni = yˆ
O
ni. (C.15)
Counterfactual trade shares are obtained using (17), which leads to
pˆini =
(
wˆi
aˆi
)1−σ
∑
k∈N
(
wˆk
aˆk
)1−σ
pink
. (C.16)
Finally, we express tenure-specific counterfactual changes in commuting flows by di-
viding the counterfactual population mobility condition by the equilibrium mobility
condition (22):
λˆωni =
(
Gˆ
)β (
yˆωni
Pˆαn rˆ
ω1−α
n
)(1−β)
∑
l∈ω
∑
f∈N
∑
k∈N
(
Gˆ
)β ( yˆlkf
Pˆαk rˆ
l1−α
k
)(1−β)
λlkf
. (C.17)
Note that (C.12) to (C.17) are expressed in terms of counterfactual changes (and
not values) because the baseline level of the considered outcome is simplified.
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Figure C.1: MSAs vs. countryside: Renters and owner-occupiers
(a) Repealing the MID (b) Doubling the standard deduction
Note: Panel a) depicts counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0 and Panel b) depicts counterfactual changes by setting s = 12′717 USD.
Workers can change place of residence, work and tenure mode. MSAs are defined according to Saiz (2010). County-level counterfactual
changes are aggregated using weighted averages based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting
are weighted by the number of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, prices, and housing costs are weighted by the number
of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
We compute changes in the provision of the public good using (9)
GˆG =
1
L¯
∑
n∈N
(
L¯τ τˆ
∑
k∈N
λˆRnkλ
R
nk(wkwˆk − s)
+ L¯τ τˆ
∑
k∈N
λˆOnkλ
O
nk(wkwˆk − ζˆnkζnk)
)
.
(C.18)
Equations (C.1)-(C.18) hold for each location and allow us to solve the system for
counterfactual changes in commuting λˆωni, public good provision Gˆ, and real income
yˆωni
Pˆαn rˆ
ω1−α
n
. These changes build up the counterfactual value of the welfare, which using
(24) is given by
̂¯V = ( 1
λ̂ωni
) 1
 (
Gˆ
)β ( ŷωni
Pˆαn r̂
ω1−α
n
)1−β
, (C.19)
where counterfactual changes in utility are equalized across space and tenure such
that no welfare arbitrage is possible across location and tenure mode.
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C.2 Changes in the spatial distribution: further details
To complement our counterfactual analysis of Section 4 and 5, we show how tax sub-
sidy reforms affects the spatial distribution of people, wage, and income across space
when adding renters and owner-occupiers together. Figure C.1 shows decomposition
between MSAs and non-MSAs counties in the case of a repeal of the MID (panel a)
and for a doubling of the standard deduction (panel b), respectively. Additionally,
in Table C.1, we illustrate how these changes in the tax subsidies affect the spatial
dispersion of income across locations. Finally, figure C.2 shows additional maps on
the spatial distribution of main outcomes in the case of a repeal of the MID.
Table C.1: Impact of tax-subsidy reforms on spatial concentration
Repealing the MID Doubling the standard deduction
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)
Workers (Ĝini(Ln)) −0.01 −0.06 −0.03 −0.26 −0.39 −0.34
Residents (Ĝini(Rn)) −0.01 −0.06 −0.03 −0.24 −0.38 −0.33
Income (Ĝini(yni)) −0.05 −0.59 −0.46 −3.04 −3.55 −3.46
Real income (Ĝini(yni/Pαn r
1−α
n )) −0.04 −0.40 −0.31 −2.21 −2.56 −2.52
Note: Columns 1 to 3 report counterfactual changes obtained by setting θ = 0, and columns 4 to 6 report counterfactual changes
obtained by setting s = 12′717 USD. Workers can change place of residence, work and tenure mode.
C.3 MID repeal: Varying public good provision
The MID repeal directly impacts the tax revenue of the federal government. In
our benchmark model, the federal government adjusts tax rates to maintain public
good provision constant. In this section, we validate our main results by assessing
the welfare impact of the repeal when the federal government does adjust public
good provision in response to the repeal while keeping income tax rates constant.
Table C.2 shows the results. As it can be seen, in this setting the repeal leaves
the response of location and tenure choices mostly unaffected and leads to a higher
welfare increase. However, renters experience a negative (real) income change, as
they do not benefit from lower income tax rates anymore. Figure C.3 shows that our
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Figure C.2: Repealing the Mortgage Interest Deduction: County-level counterfac-
tual changes
(a) Wages (wˆn) (b) Residents (Rˆn)
(c) Productivity (aˆn) (d) In-commuters sh. - Own. (
̂∑
n6=i λ
O
ni/LˆOi )
(e) In-commuters - Owners (
∑̂
n 6=i λ
O
ni) (f) Periodic housing cost - Renters (rˆ
R
n )
Note: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. Workers
can change place of residence, place of work, and tenure mode. We depict positive (negative) growth in green (red). A
darker shading represents a stronger effect.
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Table C.2: Repealing the Mortgage Interest Deduction
Keeping location and Varying location and
tenure choices fixed tenure choices
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)
Welfare (Vˆn) - - - 0.17 0.17 0.17
Commuting (
∑
n6=i λ
′
ni/
∑
n 6=i λni) - - - 0.53 −0.40 −0.10
Residents (Rˆn) - - - 0.53 −0.29 -
Regional income (yˆni) −0.04 −0.20 −0.15 −0.03 −0.23 −0.20
Wages (wˆi) −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
Housing costs (rˆn) 0.02 −0.06 −0.03 0.28 −0.22 −0.04
Price index (Pˆn) −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
Real income (yˆni/Pˆαn rˆ
1−α
n ) −0.01 −0.16 −0.11 −0.09 −0.14 −0.16
Note: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to keep federal public expenditure fixed.
The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. In columns 1 to 3 workers do not adjust place of residence, place of work and tenure
mode. We allow for these responses in columns 4 to 6. County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages
based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the number of commuters.
Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by
the number of workers.
results concerning the shift of economic activity from MSA to non-MSA counties
are still valid.
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Figure C.3: Repealing the MID: MSAs vs. countryside
(a) Renters (b) Owners
(c) Renters and owners
Note: The figure depicts counterfactual changes obtained by setting θ = 0. The header ‘owners’ denotes
owner-occupiers. Workers can change place of residence, work and tenure mode. MSAs are defined accord-
ing to Saiz (2010). County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages based on
the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the number
of commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, prices, and housing costs are weighted by the number
of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
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D Model’s extensions
In this section, we formalize two model extensions and present counterfactual results
in the case of a MID repeal.
D.1 Property taxation
Property taxes account for less than 1% of the US federal tax revenue. However,
because deductible from the taxable income at the federal level, local property taxes
might affect the welfare and sorting decisions of individuals according to MID sub-
sidies. In this section, we thus investigate the robustness of our results when house-
holds can deduct local property taxes from their taxable income in addition to MID
subsidies.
In what follows we outline which equations of our baseline model change. Let
τ pn denote local (county-level) property tax rates. Because owner-occupiers pay
property taxes on the local housing value 1
ι
HOnir
O
n
L¯λOni
, their regional income is
yOni =wi − τ(wi − ζni) + (1−
τ pn
ι
)
HOnir
O
n
L¯λOni
−mni, (D.1)
where ζni is given by
ζni = max
(
s, θmni +
τ pn
ι
HOnir
O
n
L¯λOni
)
. (D.2)
When choosing whether to itemize, owner-occupiers thus weigh the mortgage in-
terests and property taxes against the standard deduction. We can rewrite the
disposable income of owner-occupiers as
yOni =
wi − τ(wi − ζni)
α + ( τ
p
n
ι
+ φ)(1− α) . (D.3)
From (D.3) it is apparent that property taxation decreases the income of owner-
occupiers with respect to our benchmark model.
To keep our model parsimonious , we assume that the tax revenue generated by
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Table D.1: Repealing the Mortgage Interest Deduction
Keeping location and Varying location and
tenure choices fixed tenure choices
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)
Welfare (Vˆn) - - - 0 0 0
Commuting (
∑
n6=i λ
′
ni/
∑
n 6=i λni) - - - 0.76 −0.57 −0.13
Residents (Rˆn) - - - 0.76 −0.42 -
Regional income (yˆni) 0.13 −0.10 −0.03 0.12 −0.16 −0.10
Wages (wˆi) −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03
Housing costs (rˆn) 0.04 −0.06 −0.02 0.43 −0.28 −0.03
Price index (Pˆn) −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
Real income (yˆni/Pˆαn rˆ
1−α
n ) 0.15 −0.06 0.01 0.01 −0.06 −0.07
Note: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to keep federal public expenditure fixed.
The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. In columns 1 to 3 workers do not adjust place of residence, place of work and tenure
mode. We allow for these responses in columns 4 to 6. County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages
based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the number of commuters.
Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by
the number of workers.
property taxation is collected by the federal government and equally redistributed
to workers. The federal budget must be balanced, such that
G =
1
L¯
∑
n∈N
(
τL¯
∑
k∈N
λRnk(wk − s) + τL¯
∑
k∈N
λOnk(wk − ζnk) +
τ pn
ι
HOn r
O
n
)
. (D.4)
This approach allows us focus on the effect of the increase in tax deductions caused
by property taxation without diving into considerations regarding the amount of
local public good provision provided by local governments. In fact, note that the
denominator in (D.3) simplifies in our counterfactual simulations, such that ζni is
the main terms through which property taxation acts on workers’ choices.
In our counterfactual simulations we set τ pn = 0.01 across all location, This rate,
which is based on the ACS 2009-2013, corresponds to the median payment of real
estate taxes for the median housing value. We adjust the standard deduction to
8857 USD to match the observed itemization rate of individuals itemizing the MID.
Table D.1 and Figure D.1 reports simulation results for repealing the MID in the
presence of property taxes.
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Figure D.1: Impact of eliminating MID: Decomposing welfare effects
(a) Renters (b) Owners
(c) Renters and owners
The figure depicts counterfactual changes obtained by setting θ = 0. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-
occupiers. Workers can change place of residence, work and tenure mode. MSAs are defined according
to Saiz (2010). County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages based on the
distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the number of
commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, prices, and housing costs are weighted by the number of
residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
D.2 Progressive tax schedule
In general, tax deductions become more valuable with rising income due to the pro-
gressivity of the tax system. Because tax progressivity makes the MID a regressive
subsidy, it creates an additional systematic link between a location’s productivity
and the tax incentives for owner-occupiers to live in that location. We test the
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robustness of our main results with respect to this additional sorting effect.
In what follows we illustrate how a progressive income taxation affects the equa-
tions of our baseline model. In line with the literature, we model progressive tax
rates by introducing a parameter υ > 0 governing the progressivity.33 The per-capita
income of owner-occupiers is
yOni =wi − τOni(wi − ζni) +
HOnir
O
n
L¯λOni
−mni, (D.5)
where ζni = max(s, θmni) and the tax rate relevant for homeowners is given by
1− τOni = (1− τ)(wi − ζni)−υ. Renters’ income is
yRni = wi − τRi (wi − s), (D.6)
where the relevant tax rate is given by 1− τRi = (1− τ)(wi − s)−υ. The MID thus
creates a tax rate differential between owner-occupiers and renters because it shifts
taxable labor income according to tenure mode. Tax payments of owner-occupiers
and renters are given by
TOni = wi − (1− τ)(wi − ζni)1−υ (D.7)
and
TRi = wi − (1− τ)(wi − s)1−υ, (D.8)
respectively. Per capita tax revenue of the federal government must equal per capita
public good provision, such that
G =
1
L¯
∑
n∈N
(
L¯
∑
ω
∑
k∈N
λωnkT
ω
k
)
. (D.9)
A tax schedule is defined as progressive if marginal tax rates ∂T
ω
∂w
exceed the
average tax rates T
ω
w
for every level of wages wn. This is true for renters and
owner-occupiers if υ > 0 and MID subsidies do not exist (θ = 0). However, if
υ > 0 and MID subsidies are fully deductible (θ = 1), the tax schedule is not
33see Eeckhout and Guner (2015), Heathcote et al. (2017) or Fajgelbaum et al. (2019).
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Table D.2: Repealing the Mortgage Interest Deduction
Keeping location and Varying location and
tenure choices fixed tenure choices
Renters Owners Total Renters Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Counterfactual changes (in %)
Welfare (Vˆn) - - - 0.01 0.01 0.01
Commuting (
∑
n6=i λ
′
ni/
∑
n 6=i λni) - - - 1.14 −0.81 −0.17
Residents (Rˆn) - - - 1.10 −0.60 -
Regional income (yˆni) 0.21 −0.13 −0.03 0.20 −0.21 −0.15
Wages (wˆi) −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
Housing costs (rˆn) 0.08 −0.07 −0.02 0.64 −0.40 −0.02
Price index (Pˆn) −0.04 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
Real income (yˆni/Pˆαn rˆ
1−α
n ) 0.21 −0.09 0.01 0.03 −0.06 −0.11
Note: We compute counterfactual changes by setting θ = 0. Counterfactual tax rates adjust to keep federal public expenditure fixed.
The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-occupiers. In columns 1 to 3 workers do not adjust place of residence, place of work and tenure
mode. We allow for these responses in columns 4 to 6. County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages
based on the distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the number of commuters.
Changes in residents, (real) income, rents, and prices are weighted by the number of residents. Changes in wages are weighted by
the number of workers.
necessarily progressive over the entire wage distribution of owner-occupiers. In fact,
because owner-occupiers spend a constant share of their income for housing, the MID
counteracts the progressive nature of the tax schedule. In this setting, at a specific
cut-off point of the income distribution the tax schedule changes from regressive to
progressive.
Our benchmark model features no tax progressivity (υ = 0), thus imposing that
marginal tax rates are equal to average tax rates. To introduce tax rate progres-
sivity, we calibrate the progressivity parameter according to Eeckhout and Guner
(2015), who estimate υ = 0.12 for the US income tax system. We adapt the stan-
dard deduction to 6341 USD to match the observed share of people itemizing MID
subsidies according to IRS data. Additionally, we calibrate the tax shifter τ to
match the government revenue of our benchmark chase, such that the results in the
case of progressive tax rates are not affected by changes in public expenditure at
the federal level. Table D.2 and Figure D.2 report the results of repealing the MID
in the presence of tax progressivity.
59
Figure D.2: Impact of eliminating MID: Decomposing welfare effects
(a) Renters (b) Owners
(c) Renters and owners
The figure depicts counterfactual changes obtained by setting θ = 0. The header ‘owners’ denotes owner-
occupiers. Workers can change place of residence, work and tenure mode. MSAs are defined according
to Saiz (2010). County-level counterfactual changes are aggregated using weighted averages based on the
distribution of outcomes in the baseline scenario. Changes in commuting are weighted by the number of
commuters. Changes in residents, (real) income, prices, and housing costs are weighted by the number of
residents. Changes in wages are weighted by the number of workers.
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